吃瓜大本营

The Transportation Security Administration is turning to video technology to double down on its embattled effort to figure out our thoughts based on our behavior.

In a released last week, TSA revealed that it is field-testing (heads-up if you鈥檒l be traveling through the airport in Providence, Rhode Island) the 鈥淐entralized Hostile Intent鈥� program, which will assess 鈥渨hether behavioral indicators of malicious intent鈥� can be observed on a live video feed by TSA officers in remote locations.

The program is part of TSA鈥檚 larger Behavior Detection and Analysis program鈥攆ormerly Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques, or 鈥淪POT鈥濃�攖hrough which thousands of 鈥渂ehavior detection officers鈥� in airports across the country scrutinize travelers for signs of 鈥渕al-intent.鈥� According to , those signs can include conduct as menacing as being late for your flight, yawning, or having body odor (we need you now more than ever, ).

I hesitate to call the TSA鈥檚 behavior detection program controversial, because that implies that it has at least some meaningful support. Virtually everyone outside the TSA who has reviewed the program鈥� , members of Congress from , 鈥攈as concluded that it is flawed and wasteful. We鈥檝e been critical of the program as not only divorced from science, but also for encouraging discriminatory racial profiling. In March we filed a lawsuit for more information about the program鈥攁nd perhaps any insight into why TSA continues to fund it.

So we were confused and disoriented (those are also among TSA鈥檚 signs of deception!) when we learned of the Centralized Hostile Intent experiment, which uses techniques that the TSA says would allow it to 鈥渆xpand the scale of its behavior detection program.鈥� To test the program, TSA is sending volunteer actors into airport screening areas, filming them while they 鈥渕imic passengers who exhibit suspicious behaviors with hostile intent,鈥� and then seeing if behavior detection officers watching the video can detect the suspicious behaviors.

I鈥檓 not a social scientist, but trying to detect volunteer actors pretending to be suspicious hardly seems like a bulletproof validation method. The results are likely to reflect the acting (or over-acting) ability of the volunteers as much as anything real. More troubling, however, is that TSA still seems oblivious to the fundamental problems with behavior detection: even if officers can detect these behaviors reliably, there鈥檚 no indication that the behaviors actually reflect deception or 鈥渕al-intent,鈥� as opposed to everyday innocent conduct. That being the case, it鈥檚 difficult to see how these programs amount to anything more than what a former behavior detection officer a 鈥渓icense to harass,鈥� and another 鈥渁 racial profiling program.鈥�

The picture gets darker still. This week鈥檚 privacy impact assessment also stated that 鈥渧ideo data鈥� from the project will be used to develop 鈥渢racking algorithms for multi-camera person and object detection to determine a person鈥檚 path or possible associates in an operational environment.鈥� So if TSA officers in think you鈥檙e too fidgety, too sweaty, too harried鈥攁nd this is at the airport, remember鈥攖hey鈥檒l use video technology to track you, identify your family and friends, and track them, too.

On the same day that the TSA disclosed the Centralized Hostile Intent program, the Department of Homeland Security鈥檚 Inspector General issued a scathing to Congress on TSA鈥檚 鈥渓ack of stewardship of taxpayer dollars,鈥� 鈥渜uestionable investment in security,鈥� and 鈥渇ailure to understand the gravity of the situation.鈥� Those are apt descriptions of the mind-reading and surveillance schemes that make up the TSA鈥檚 behavior detection programs.