Huskey v. Oregon Department of Corrections
What's at Stake
This case in the Oregon Supreme Court centers on whether Article I, Section 41(3) of the Oregon Constitution, which provides that Oregon prisoners lack legally enforceable rights to prison jobs and training, bars prisoners from collecting damages relating to lost prison jobs and training caused by the alleged breach of a settlement agreement by prison officials. The ACLU’s State Supreme Court Initiative, alongside the ACLU of Oregon, filed an amicus brief arguing that that plaintiff Arnold Huskey, an incarcerated individual whose identity was used in Department of Corrections training materials, is entitled to damages notwithstanding Article I, Section 41(3), because plaintiffs in contract disputes never have to show standalone legal rights to the damages they claim. Instead, they need only show that the damages were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the alleged breach of contract.
Summary
The case asks whether he Oregon Constitution bars incarcerated individuals from recovering damages for lost prison job and training opportunities when prison officials breach settlement agreements with them. In April 2010, Arnold Huskey sued the Department of Corrections alleging medical negligence. This case was settled, and Mr. Huskey’s prison placement was changed in exchange for the DOC agreeing to refrain from retaliation. However, the DOC then used Mr. Huskey’s identity in prison training materials which portrayed him in a negative light. Mr. Huskey alleged that those actions amounted to retaliation, in breach of the settlement agreement, and resulted in a loss of prison jobs and training opportunities.
Under basic contract law principles, this theory of breach and damages is valid. When two parties agree on a contract, they create enforceable legal rights in the performance of the contract. If one side breaches, the other side can recover damages caused by the breach, so long as those damages were reasonably foreseeable.
But the Oregon Court of Appeals concluded otherwise. It held that damages for lost prison job and training opportunities are barred by Article I, Section 41(3) of the Oregon Constitution. That provision mandates full-time work or on-the-job training for incarcerated individuals, but adds this disclaimer: “However, no inmate has a legally enforceable right to a job or to otherwise participate in work, on-the-job training or educational programs or to compensation for work or labor performed while an inmate of any state, county or city corrections facility or institution.”
The ACLU and the ACLU of Oregon filed an amicus brief with the Oregon Supreme Court arguing that the Court of Appeals’ interpretation is incorrect. The brief argues that, under contract law principles, Mr. Huskey does not need to establish an enforceable legal right to prison jobs and training in order to recover damages for lost prison jobs and training. He need only show that those losses were reasonably foreseeable consequences of the DOC’s breach of its prior settlement with Mr. Huskey. Thus, Article I, Section 41(3) of the Oregon Constitution is simply irrelevant to Mr. Huskey’s contract claim. The ACLU amicus brief also explains that the Court of Appeals’ approach, if adopted by the Oregon Supreme Court, would discourage settlements and encourage needless, expensive trials because it would undermines the ability for incarcerated individuals and prison officials to enter into enforceable agreements.
Legal Documents
-
08/27/2024
Brief of Amici Curiae
Date Filed: 08/27/2024
Affiliate: Oregon