吃瓜大本营

The Constitution requires that defendants be afforded certain specific trial procedures鈥攊ncluding the right to be confronted with witnesses against them鈥攁nd courts may not dilute these guarantees or deviate from prescribed procedures on a case-by-case basis because they deem their application unfair or unnecessary. The New York Court of Appeals, however, has developed a doctrine that permits just that. Under its rule, a trial court may determine that a criminal defendant has 鈥渙pened the door鈥� to the admission of evidence otherwise barred by the Confrontation Clause if the court determines, in its discretion, that such evidence is 鈥渞easonably necessary to correct鈥� an 鈥渋ncomplete and misleading鈥� impression created by the defendant鈥檚 evidence or argument.

Amici鈥攖he ACLU, the New York Civil Liberties Union, and the Rutherford Institute鈥攁rgue in this brief that New York鈥檚 judge-made exception to the Confrontation Clause is unconstitutional. The New York court鈥檚 rule replaces the Constitution鈥檚 predictable, specific procedure for assessing reliability through cross-examination and jury factfinding with ad hoc and standardless judicial determinations of 鈥渇airness,鈥� permitting judges to override the Confrontation Clause whenever they believe doing so is 鈥渞easonably necessary鈥� to correct a misleading defense presentation. It is unsupported by either the text of the Confrontation Clause or the scope of the confrontation right at the time of the founding. Moreover, such an open-ended, discretionary standard, based on the judge鈥檚 own assessment of the facts, violates the core purpose of the Confrontation Clause, and risks penalizing defendants simply for contradicting the prosecution鈥檚 case.